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In many economic and social settings one person or 
institution is in charge of communicating with and 
disclosing information to multiple agents who are 
engaged in a strategic interaction. This communication 
takes the form of information provision about an issue 
or an object of common interest – the fundamental – 
which impacts the payoffs of the interaction. 
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Instances of such situations are 
ubiquitous in everyday life. For 
example, in advertising, companies 
choose how much and what type 
of information to reveal about their 
new products in order to optimally 
target different groups of customers 
through samples, demo versions, 
and brochures; in financial markets, 
a firm’s disclosure of information 
about its profitability is relevant both 
to shareholders and competitors, 
albeit in very different ways; in 
economic policy, a central bank’s 
announcement of its stimulus plan 
affects the economic outlook and 
behavior of consumers, as well 
as those of domestic and foreign 
investors. 
The following excerpt1 from the 
Economist provides a good context 
for the role and importance of 
information provision in economic 
policy:
1 The Economist, June 22, 2013, “The 
Federal Reserve: Clearer, but less 
cuddly”.
It is not what 
you do but the 
way you say it: 
The other way to minimize 
the risks of prolonged 
bond-buying is to be as 
clear as possible about the 
circumstances in which it 
will end. Vague references 
to a “substantial” 
improvement in the job 
market were not enough. 
That is why Mr. Bernanke’s 
specificity this week was so 
important. In a zero-interest-
rate environment the 
central bank can influence 
monetary conditions more 
through words than through 
actions. Its most powerful 
tool is its ability to influence 
investors’ 
expectations of 
future inflation.
All of the above examples share 
the common feature that an 
information provider – referred to 
as the designer – with a certain 
objective of her own, chooses the 
informativeness and correlation 
of signals reported truthfully to 
a group of agents. The agents 
pay attention to the signals they 
observe for two reasons. First, the 
signals convey information about 
the fundamental, which is relevant 
for determining the payoffs and 
incentives in the underlying strategic 
interaction. Second, since signals 
are correlated, each agent can infer 
something about the knowledge 
and beliefs of his opponents, which 
in turn affect his strategically optimal 
choice of action. After observing his 
own signal, each agent forms these 
expectations about the fundamental 
and the knowledge of the other 
agents, and takes an action. It is 
through these channels that the 
provided information determines the 
resulting equilibrium of the strategic 
interaction – a stable outcome from 
which no agent wants to unilaterally 
deviate. Thus, by choosing the 
structure of signals, the designer 
can provide incentives for agents to 
behave in a desired, most beneficial 
for her objective, way.
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My paper contributed to the 
literature by extending the 
Bayesian persuasion framework 
(Kamenica and Gentzkow 2011), 
which only allows for a single 
receiver, to situations where the 
designer is disclosing information 
to multiple interacting agents. As 
the agents care not only about 
the fundamental, but also about 
each other’s actions, this extension 
is not trivial since it involves 
considerations of higher-order 
informational effects. To circumvent 
these issues I use a solution 
concept developed by Bergemann 
and Morris (2014). I show that in a 
special case, this solution concept 
characterizes the set of all possible 
equilibria of the agents’ interaction. 
The designer can thus optimize her 
objective over this set and select 
equilibrium that is most beneficial 
for her. Then, I show how to infer out 
the signal structure that induces the 
desired equilibrium once disclosed 
to the agents.
Broadly speaking, information 
design is about the optimal choice 
of information provision so that the 
resulting equilibrium played by the 
agents maximizes the objective of 
the designer in expectation. It is a 
powerful tool as it does not require 
incentivizing behavior through 
monetary transfers and the related 
issue of budget balancedness. 
Instead, the proper incentives 
are created through the signals 
released to the agents, which share 
different degrees of correlation 
and informativeness about the 
fundamental.
Of course, the optimal information 
release depends on the particular 
objective the designer wants to 
achieve. The information designer 
can be, for example, a benevolent 
policy maker interested in 
maximizing social welfare. In the 
context of a bank run or a currency 
attack framework, the policy maker 
would like to avoid these socially 
undesirable equilibria. She can 
achieve this objective by designing 
the signals agents observe in a 
way that minimizes the probability 
of a coordination failure occurring. 
Instead of releasing publicly 
observable signals, it might be 
optimal in this setting to provide 
only some individuals with privately 
observable signals.
Alternatively, rather than having the 
social good in mind, the information 
designer can be completely self-
interested. For example, consider 
a prosecutor who would like to 
convince a jury that a defendant 
is guilty. In this setting, unanimity 
is needed for the jury to reach a 
verdict. The prosecutor conducts 
an investigation and reports the 
resulting findings to a jury. While 
she is required by law to fully 
and truthfully report the results 
to the jury, she can choose how 
to structure her investigation by 
deciding on which witnesses to 
subpoena, what questions to ask 
them, which forensic and other 
tests to order, how to structure her 
arguments, etc. If the defendant 
is guilty, then choosing a more 
informative investigation will 
tend to help the prosecutor’s 
case and increase the likelihood 
of conviction. However, if the 
defendant is innocent, a more 
informative investigation will 
impede the prosecutor’s case. 
The question information design 
answers is whether and how the 
prosecutor can gain by choosing 
the investigation process optimally, 
in a way that maximizes the overall 
probability of conviction by a jury 
consisting of rational agents, who 
update their beliefs based on the 
information provided. The specifics 
of the optimal informativeness of 
the investigation depend upon the 
prior beliefs of the jury members 
regarding the defendant’s 
innocence. Nonetheless, the optimal 
investigation will perfectly reveal his 
guilt whenever the defendant is in 
fact guilty, and will only sometimes 
reveal his innocence when he is 
innocent. Moreover, by persuading a 
jury of multiple people, the designer 
can play off the complementarities 
in their actions and lower the extent 
to which each individual juror needs 
to be convinced of guilt in order to 
vote for conviction. This example 
also suggests that it is important 
to consider the implications of 
information design, and, in certain 
instances, try to mitigate its 
undesirable consequences through 
appropriate design of institutions 
and incentives.
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